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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 20922

-vALDOLPHO DIAZ MENDOZA and
ALBERTO RUIZ MENDIETA,
Defendants-Respondents.

STATEMENT

OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Defendant-Respondent Mendieta views the following issues as
being presented by the Interlocutory Appeal:
1.

The trial court's failure to make findings under Utah

R. Crim. P. 12(g)%
a.

Whether the trial court implicitly made such

findings based on the outrageous conduct of the
Border Patrol, and,
b.

Whether Rule 12(g) Utah R. Crim. P. is un-

constitutional as embracing a lower standard of
search and seizure in violation of the United States
Constitution Fourth Amendment.
2.

Whether the standard applied by the trial judge in suppress-

ing the evidence based on the illegal stop and search of the vehicle
was a substantial violation of defendant's rights and, whether
committed in good faith or bad faith by the arresting officers.
3.

Whether the defendants had "standing" to challenge the

stop/search of the vehicle?
4.

Whether statements elicited from both the driver and

passenger of the vehicle by members of the Border Patrol were in

violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda
X- Arizonay the defendants having been "detained" and "seized"
within the Fourth Amendment in that they were not free to leave
the scene at the time the statements were made and were in "custody"
at the time the statements were made.
5.

Whether the stop of the vehicle and the detention of the

defendants was illegal and whether the subsequent interrogation
followed by the arrest of defendants and the search of the vehicle
producing the contraband were properly suppressed by the trial
court.
6.

Whether the mere fact of the trial judge's failure to

specify verbally that the officers acted in bad faith is fatal to
his findings, in view of the fact that he found the stop of the
vehicle and the statements elicited from the defendants,and the
search of the vehicle illegal and a violation of the United States
Constitution Fourth Amendment, and, if so

whether a simple remand

back to the trial court to make the required findings would suffice
rather than a reversal.
7.

Whether such findings are required at all if this court

finds that Rule 12(g) is unconstitutional and in violation of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant/Respondent Mendieta agrees with the Attorney General's
statement of the case as outlined in his opening brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant/Respondent Mendieta agrees with the statement of the
facts as outlined by the Attorney General in his opening brief with
the following additions and corrections.

James Stiegler testified at the suppression hearing that he
was a United States Border Patrol Agent and had been so for ten
yearsf that his duties on March 16, 1985, in Washington County,
Utah, was to conduct a traffic check operation on 1-15, explaining
that a "traffic check operation" was the observing of traffic as
it passed his vantage point on 1-15.

(See SH 47-49)

Stiegler testified that the point he was parked at had been
selected because it was a major route for illegal alien traffic
north from the border, the border being the international border
with Mexico, and that the border patrol conducts such operations
on a yearly basis in Utah, that he had previously worked on two
separate occasions in Nephi, Utah in the apprehension of illegal
aliens.

(See SH 49-50)

Stiegler testified that the 1-15 in Washington County was
selected as a vantage point because it is the time of year of peak
alien activity because of the planting season up north and that
there was a lot of traffic from the United States Border north,
that about 4:30 A.M., he was operating a "roving check point"
observing traffic as it went northward

on 1-15, that he noticed

something unusual at that time, that there were three vehicles
approaching, and as they went by he was watching two of them and
Officer Fox told him that he thought the black mustang which had
passed deserved a second look, that it seemed like the occupants
were of latin decent.

(See SH 50-52)

The officer along with his partner then followed the mustang
with Officer Fox driving, that they accelerated rapidly in order to
catch up with the car, that they observed it remained in the passing
lane and the occupants did not seem to notice them as they approached,
andr.pulled in behind them.

When the occupants did observe them the

they pulled over rapidly and slowed down rapidly at which time the
officer noticed the plates on the mustang were California plates.
(SH 51-53)

The officer described the change from the passing lane

to the regular driving lane on the part of the mustang as erratic
in that most of the vehicles that he passed were very aware of his
presence and did not respond in what Officer Stiegler considered a
"normal manner" (emphasis ours) (SH 52-54).

The officer further

described the movements of the mustang as being jerky and that the
mustang remained longer than was necessary in the passing lane and
decelerated rapidly. (SH 54 Line 11 - 18)
Stiegler further testified that he felt that a car with California
or Arizona plates is an indicator that the vehicle is coming from an
area which may be adjacent to the border, that if the plate had been
from Colorado or Indiana or New Jersey or one of the other 48 plates
it wouldn't have been as significant as a state that was located on
the southern border.

(SH 55, line 2-14)

Stiegler noticed that neither

of the occupants of the mustang looked at him, and that both occupants
were of latin decent, that he made no special note of the clothing
worn at that time, and that although the occupants of the mustang did
not look at him he wanted to get a better look into the vehicle and
make sure that the occupants saw he and his partner and determine what
their reaction to the officers was, so he told Fox to pull along side
of them a second time

and go all the way up near their front bumper

so that he could turn around and cross their line of vision and he then
stared at both of their faces.

(SH 57, line 2:58-2) Based on his

training and experience that the observation of the rigid posture and
demeanor of the occupants of the mustang was another indicator to him
that they were probably illegal aliens or transporting illegal aliens.
(SH 59, line 6 - 20)

He felt the response by the occupants of the mustang was not
typical behavior

for the average car which he pulls alongside of.

Stiegler then testified that the reason he stopped the vehicle was
to determine whether the occupants were illegal aliens. (SH 61, line
18-22)
Stielger then testified that after the car was stopped he got
out of his patrol car and approached the driver and interrogated him
as to his alienage

or citizenship. (SH 53, line 4 - 7 )

The officer

also determined at this time that the driver was wearing a Mexican
poncho and that would be unusual for United States citizens. (SH 63-64)
The driver then admitted to the officer that he was indeed an illegal
alien and the officer arrested the driver. (SH 64-65)
On cross-examination Stiegler admitted that he carries out his
duties pursuant to Statute 237, (Title 8

of the Immigration Act) and

that that act gives immigration officers the power to interrogate any
alien or person believed to be an alien anywhere in the United States.
(SH 67, line 24:68-20)
Stiegler went on to
vehicles who

testify that he did not stop any persons in

appeared to be caucasion, nor blacks, and in fact that

most of the people going north at that time of the year were Mexicans
or Mexican-Americans.
Stiegler also testified that he pulled up at a rapid speed behind
the mustang, continued at a rapid speed until just behind the vehicle
and then applied the brakes or slowed his vehicle very quickly, that
the purpose behind that maneuver

was to catch up to the car before

it got to a group of lights so they could see the interior of the
vehicle and the occupants, and viewed it as significant that the
car did not immediately pull over which in the officers view would
be a "normal" thing to do, admitting though that there were no

lights blinked by the officers nor were there any red lights put on
to pull the car over, that their car is a green car, not a black and
white car and has a decal on the side.

(See SH 76 - 78)

Admitting

that the police vehicle would look like any other vehicle to the
occupants of the mustang, that this maneuver

of speeding up at a

high rate of speed and braking suddenly behind the mustang was performed on a second occasion at which time the mustang did pull over
to the right at which time the officers followed the mustang to the
side of the road.

(SH 79 - 80)

That the officers were three to six

feet behind the vehicle at a speed of approximately 55 miles an hour,
and that what the officers characterized as "erratic" driving was
the fact that the vehicle stayed in the passing lane when there was
light traffic and that when the officers approach rapidly and follow
closely behind they still stayed in the passing lane and that when
they finally moved over their movements were jerky and decelerated
rapidly.

Admitting again that the border patrol car had no special

lights on, no siren, that none were blinked or waved at the car they
were following at the time it pulled over. (See SH 79 - 83)
The officer stated in regard to the California.plates on the
mustang, that California was a border state with Mexico, although he
didn't know how much of California bordered on Mexico and had no

way of telling whether the car was from Northern California, Los
Angolon, or nny orhor locnrion in Cnli form* n. (STT R5 - 86)
The officer further stated that cars with California and Texas
plates

would cause him to pay more attention to those vehicles

especially if there were Mexicans inside. (SH 87, line 3 - 10)

That

when his vehicle pulled along side the mustang he took as significant
the fact that the occupants did not look back at him as most

"Americans" would do.

(SH 87, line 23 - 88:6)

Finally, that the

decision to stop the vehicle was to ascertain if the occupants were
illegal aliens or transporters of illegal aliens, and the facts
supporting that stop was the fact that it had a California plate,
and the way it pulled over after the officers came up behind it
quickly and the fact that the car contained two persons of latin
decent that did not look back at the officers.

(SH 91, line 5 -92:6)

When Stiegler approached the driver's side of the vehicle he
asked questions of the driver (Mendoza) as to whether or not he was
a United States citizen, did not ask him for any driver's license or
identification prior to those questions, was told by Mendoza that he
was in the United States legally, and that he had papers but had
left them at home and only then did the officer ask for identification
which Mendoza was unable to produce, the officer then questioned him
further as to whether he was an illegal alien and did not advise
Mendoza of his "Miranda" rights before he asked those questions.
During this interrogation Mendoza admitted he was an illegal alien
and was arrested.

The trunk of the vehicle was searched and no

consent was obtained to search the vehicle. (SH 92 - 94)

Stiegler

further admitted on redirect examination that insofar as a "profile
vehicle"

that this particular ford mustang was not, and that the

fact that the vehicle was not a profile vehicle would not be a factor
in his consideration in pulling it over. (SH 97 -98)
Dennis Fox testified as follov/s:
That he v:as a Border Patrol Agent stationed in Montana on
temporary duty in the St. George area of Utah, that on the niaht
in question he was with Officer Stiegler, saw the mustang drive
by the point at which the officers were sitting, followed it,

eventually stopped it and does not recall whether he approached
the driver or the passenger. (SH 102 -103)
He interrogated the passenger (Mendieta) to see if any
immigration law had been broken, he asked for documents and status
etc., from Mendieta,

Mendieta replied that he had papers but he

had left them at home. (SH 104)
With regard to the stopping of the vehicle, Fox testified that
he was the driver of the Border Patrol vehicle, that after the
vehicle had passed that he wanted a better look at it, and when
asked whether the real reason he wanted to stop the car was because
the occupants appeared to be Mexican his answer was, he didn't
know, he just wanted a better look at the car. (SH 107-108)
In attempting to get this "better look" at the car and the
occupants Fox testified that he drove up very fast behind the car
then along side of it at speeds up to 85 miles per hour, that
when he got up behind them he slowed quickly at which time he was
within a few feet of the mustang, that he performed this operation
twice, that on the second occasion the car did pull over to the
right, that the mustang was not supposed to drive in the passing
lane, in his opinion, because where Fox comes from people don't
drive in the passing lane. (See SH 109 -112)
Fox further stated that he was not enforcing any Utah traffic
laws and that in his experience when he drives up fast behind a
vehicle that some people pull over put on the brakes and jump out,
both citizens and illegal aliens. (SH 113-114)
When hfe got a better look at the occupants of the vehicle
he observed they were of latin decent and the "way they looked"
was significant to him, (SH 115) that they were nervous,

staring straight ahead, and he "wondered" how many people were in
the vehicle inasmuch as he could only see two, (SH 115-116) and
that he wanted to find out if any others were in the car. (SH 117)
In response to the question as to why he stopped the car, his
response was that it was a number of things, a combination of the
route of travel, the time of travel, the time of year, California
plates on the vehicle and the nervousness of the occupants, (SH 118)
and that he didn't know if he would have taken the same action if
there was a caucasion driving the car rather than a latin. (SH 118)
Regarding the questioning of the driver, Fox stated that he
did not advise him regarding his Miranda rights before he questioned
him, "thinks" that he told the driver why he was stopped, but doesn't
know for sure, asked him his name, where he was from and if he had
immigration documents, that the driver did not have immigration
documents.

Fox then questioned the passenger (Mendieta), asked him

if he was a legal or illegal alien, and was told by Mendieta that
he had left his immigration documents at home, that he was here
legally, that he checked no further to see where Mendieta's

home

might be or where he could get the papers, assumed there was a
violation of federal law by the fact that Mendieta had said he
had no papers on him and further stated that

he (Fox) did not

have a reasonable suspicion in his mind that Mendieta had violated
the law when he asked the question responding

that "no, you don't

know unless you ask". (See SH 125 - 127)
Fox

also

testified that he did not give any Miranda warnings

prior to his questions of Mendieta. (SH 128)
Lastly, Fox testified that after both passenger and driver
were arrested that he (Fox) removed the keys from the mustang, opened

the trunk, observed the contraband here in issue. (See SH 105-106)
The above summarizes the testimony at the motion to suppress
as it relates to the issues decided by the trial court and the
facts as relating to the "standing" issue are hereby adopted by
respondent as stated in the Attorney General's brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court hearing the live evidence presemted at the
motion to suppress, observing the witnesses demeanor on the stand,
assessing their credibility and taking the case under submission and
after having read the points and authorities submitted by both sides
came to the conclusion that the evidence seized pursuant to the
arrest of the two defendants, and all statements made by those
defendants subsequent to the stop of their vehicle, should be
suppressed, finding as a matter of fact that the stop, sea'rch and
arrest made by the Border Patrol officers, were made as a result of
a roving patrol, but the stop was made without probable cause and
was conducted in an unreasonable manner by the Border Patrol officers.
The court further found that each defendant had standing to
raise the issue of the legality of the stop (had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the vehicle), were lawfully and legally in possession of the automobile, and had exclusive
use and possession of the automobile by virtue of the previous
permission granted to the driver and passenger to be in and occupying
the vehicle on the date of the arrest.
Although the trial court used the words "probable cause",
the court also used the words "no basis" which could be viewed
as no "reasonable suspicion".

The terminology reasonable suspicion

being in the view of some, a lesser standard than that of probable
cause, nevertheless, the word "basis" as used by the trial court

could be interpreted to be synonymous with the words reasonable
suspicion and therefor

the court's application of either test to

the facts before it was proper•
As to the legal nicety of whether or not the stop/search/seizure
arrest of defendants was a "substantial" violation of their constitutional rights, it should be obvious from the facts elicited
at the motion to suppress and the conduct of the officers in deciding
to and making the stop in the manner in which they did approaching
at the enormously high rates of speed within a few feet of the vehicle
and then asserting that because the occupants then moved over to
the right hand side of the road in somewhat erratic manner that this
supplied some additional factor of probable cause is ludicrous.

To

accept that interpretation would allow the officers to "manufacture
their own probable cause" by their own outrageous conduct and then
benefit from that conduct by asserting that the response to that
outrageous conduct gave rise to suspicion of illegal activity.
The Border Patrol officers on duty at the so-called checkpoint
between the borders of Arizona and Utah, many hundreds of miles from
both the Canadian and Mexican border had no legal authority to enforce
Utah's laws, and certainly under the Federal Rules allowing at most
some enforcement authority within a 100 air miles of the borders of
the Continental United States would not empower the officers from
the Border Patrol to take any action with regards to "roving patrols"
in a search for illegal aliens in a location where this stop was
made.
In addition, Rule 12(g) is unconstitutional as setting a lower
standard than that required by the United States Supreme Court and
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

As will be

discussed later in this brief, states can set a higher standard
if they wish, for Fourth Amendment protections, but cannot, in any
event set a lower standard than that set by the federal government
and the United States Supreme Court.

It is respondent's opinion

that the court will not have to reach that issue and resolve the
constitutionality of Rule 12(g), that this case can be decided on
other bases rendering a decision on the constitutionality Rule 12(g)
unnecessary.
Finally, it is clear from the facts in this case that both
respondents, Mendieta and Mendoza, were detained at the time of the
stop by the Border Patrol, that they were not free to leave, and
that therefore the interrogation by the officers of both the driver
and passenger of the car which resulted in the admissions that they
were illegal aliens, and therefore justified their arrest and
theoretically the later seizure, were in violation of the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona and therefore the statements being
inadmissible the later arrests of respondents and the subsequent
search of the vehicle should be suppressed as the result of and the
fruit of the earlier illegally obtained statements.
ARGUMENT
POINT :r
THE STANDARD APPLIED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE REGARDING THE STOP
OF THE VEHICLE WAS THE CORRECT STANDARD, AND, THERE WAS
A SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
WHETHER OR NOT COMMITTED IN GOOD FAITH/BAD FAITH.
The holding by the trial court that the stop of the defendant's
vehicle was unlawful was based on a correct standard when it ruled
that "there was no basis" or probable cause for said officers to
make the initial stop. . . . (Contrary to the attorney general's
argument on page 19 of his brief indicating that there were no

-1 9-

articulable facts as a basis. . .

for the officers to make the

initial stop.
From the testimony elicited at the motion to suppress it appears
undisputed that there was no probable cause to arrest the occupants
of the vehicle nor was there any probable cause to stop the vehicle.
The "reasonable suspicion test appears to be the proper test to
apply to the stop of the vehicle under these circumstances, if in
fact this court determines that the officers had any valid authority
to do so in the area in which they were working on the evening in
question.
The reasonable suspicion test evolves from the case of Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States of America (1973), 413 US 266, 37 L.Ed.2nd 596, 93
Supreme Court 2535.

In that case the United States Supreme Court

ruled that a roving patrol some 2_0 miles north of the Mexican border
in which a vehicle was stopped and searched by Border Patrol officers
was not justified on grounds urged by the government.
The government in Almeida-Sanchez, supra, argued that the
Immigration Nationality Act (INA) Section 287(a)(3) (Attached as
appendix One) which provides for warrantless searches of autos within
a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States
as authorized by the Attorney General of the United States.
The Attorney General's regulation defines a reasonable distance
as within 100 air miles of the border. See 8 CFR-2 87.1. (Appendix 1)
In Almeida-Sanchez, supra, the court discussed three types of
surveillance conducted by the Border Patrol regarding illegal aliens:
1.

Permanent check points (Nodal Intersections)

2.

Temporary check points (Various locations-Conducted
from time to time.

3.

Roving Patrols.

In construing the Attorney Generalfs regulation authorizing
searches and stops of vehicles within 100 miles of the border the
court in Almeida-Sanchez, supra, stated:
"No act of Congress can authorize a violation of
the Constitution."
The court held that the stop/search in this case was:
1.

Not a border search, 2.

of the border,

3.

Not the functional equivalent

Not a check point stop, but was a roving patrol

stop by the Border Patrol officers and therefore probable cause to
believe persons in the car were aliens was necessary to stop the
vehicle.
An interesting argument made by the government in AlmeidaSanchez at footnote 5 of that opinion was that a stop search on a
highway which is a common route for illegal aliens to travel was
valid and that roving patrols had apprehended 195 aliens on that
road in one year alone.
that possibly

The court's response to that argument was

all the others were stopped on valid probable cause

and that there was no way to tell how many innocent drivers were
stopped without probable cause and subjected to searches of their
vehicles.

The court then looked to the words of Justice Jackson

when he returned from the Nuremburg trials, (See 93 Supreme Court
2540) :
"These(Fourth Amendment rights), I protest, are
not mere second-class rights but belong in the
catalog of indispensible freedoms. Among deprivations
of rights none is so effective in cowing a population,
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting
terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure
is one of the first and most effective weapons in the
arsenal of every arbitrary government."
See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160.
Two years later in 1975 the United States Supreme Court ruled
in United States v. Brignoni Ponce, 422 US 873, 45 L.Ed.2d 607,

95 Supreme Court 2574, that a roving patrol could stop autos only
if officers were aware of specific articulable facts that reasonably
warranted suspicion that autos contained illegal aliens and that the
Mexican ancestry of the occupants is not sufficient standing alone
to justify a stop.
Brignoni Ponce differed from Almeida-Sanchez in that the Border
Patrol did not claim authority to search cars but did claim the
authority to stop and question occupants regarding their citizenship
and immigration status.

In Brignoni Ponce the Border Patrol officers

were working at a fixed check point located at Highway 5, south of
San Clemente, California, however at the time they observed the
vehicle in question the check point had been closed because of
inclement weather.
The two Border Patrol officers were nevertheless watching the
northbound traffic from a car on the highway, it was dark and they
were using their headlights to see into the passing cars.

They saw

a car pass containing three mexicans, stopped it and questioned the
occupants regarding their status.

The questioning of the occupants

led the officers to believe that they were illegal aliens, they were
all three arrested and one of them was charged with a violation of
federal law regarding transportation of illegal aliens.

The trial

court denied a motion to suppress the testimony regarding the
questions and answers of the occupants at the time of the stop.

The

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held this to be a roving patrol rather
than a fixed check point stop and that the Fourth Amendment forbids
such a stop for questioning unless on founded suspicion that the car
contained aliens and that mexican ancestry alone was not a founded
suspicion.
At oral argument the government conceded that the stop was a

roving patrol however, they argued that 10 to 12 million aliens
were in the United States at that time, that 85 percent of those
were from Mexico and that it was the Broder Patrol's goal to
prevent inward movement in the United States and thcit stopping
automobiles and questioning the occupants as to their status was
a "modest intrusion" and that all that was required was an answer
to certain questions of the Border Patrol and production of documents
showing a right to be in the United States•
The Supreme Court rejected the government's argument and
affirmed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal and in doing so reviewed
the requirements of Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L.Ed,2nd 889, 88
Supreme Court 1868, regarding the requirements of a pat down search
for weapons and that the officer in conducting a "Terry" stop must
reasonably believe that the suspect stopped is armed and dangerous
and that a pat down search is necessary for his safety, and that
this believe must be based on specific articulable facts and rational
inferences

based thereon to warrant such a belief.

The "brief stop" in Terry, suprs, was held to constitute a
"seizure" under the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court held in Brignoni Ponce, supra, that when the
officer's observations lead him to reasonably suspect that the auto
may contain illegal aliens he may stop the car briefly and investigate
the circumstances which provoked the suspicion.

He may ask the

driver and passenger regarding their immigration status but any
further detention or search must be based on probable cause or consent.
Some of the factors considered in determining whether the officers
might have probable cause in such a stop are as follows:
1.

The distance from the border to the stop was made,

2.

Information in possession of the officers regarding

earlier border crossings of this particular car,
3.

The normal pattern of traffic in the area,

4.

The driver's suspicious behavior,

5.

The officerfs observations that the vehicle appears
to be heavily loaded,

6.

The number of passengers in the car,

1.

Erratic driving,

8.

An

9.

Characteristic appearance of aliens,

attempt to evade the officers when being stopped,
i.e. mode of dress,

haircut, etc.
The court in Brignoni Ponce, supra, also examined the Attorney
General's regulation (8 CFR 2 87.1(a)) regarding 100 air

miles from

the border being reasonable and held it was not reasonable to make
such stops on a random basis.

(See Appendix 1 )

The court also commented that large numbers of native born and
naturalized citizens, even those living in border areas have the
same physical characteristics as illegal Mexican aliens, and again
concluded that Mexican ancestry may be a factor to be considered
but it was not enough standing alone to justify a stop to inquire.
Another case which came down in 1975 from the United States
Supreme Court in which the court examined the relationship between
a temporary check point and a roving stop was United States of America
v. Ortiz, 422 US 891, 95 Supreme Court 2585.
In Ortiz, supra, the Border Patrol was maintaining a check point
at San Clemente about 62 air miles north of the Mexican border, and
stopped the car for a routine immigration search at the traffic
check point.

Three aliens concealed in the trunk of the car were

found and the driver was convicted of transporting aliens.

The

Ninth Circuit reversed on the bais of Almeida-Sanchez, and on review

the Supreme Court stated that the only question for decision was
whether or not vehicle searches at traffic check points like the
roving patrol in Almeida-Sanchez must be based on probable cause.
See Ortiz, supra, page 2586.
In holding that the roving patrol and the check point stop
were identical in sofaras

the search of the vehicle was concerned,

the court held that the regularity, notice to motorists, etc., which
attended the check point stop did not mitigate the invasion of
privacy that a search would entail, that motorists whose cars are
searched unlike those that are only questioned are not reassured by
seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars as well.
In addition the court held they were not pursuaded that the
check point limits the officer's discretion to select cars for
search in any meaningful way.
The court stated at page 2588 in Ortiz"
"This degree of discretion to search private
automobiles is not consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. A search, even of an automobile,
is a substantial invasion of privacy.
(Emphasis ours) To protect that privacy from
official arbitrariness, the court has always
regarded probable cause as the minimum
requirement for a lawful search."
The analysis of the above cases and the current state of the
law is that a "roving patrol" even on a highway leading directly
from the border and only 2 0 to 30 miles from Mexico requires
probable cause in order for the officers to legally stop the vehicle
(Absent a fixed check point regarded as the "functional equivalent"
of the border).

Further probable cause or consent would be

necessary in order to search the vehicle, and this is so even if
the occupants of the vehicle i.e., the driver and passenger were
arrested validly for being illegal aliens.

Absent some showing that the vehicle itself was heavily loaded
or other probable cause to believe that it came directly from the
border or contained illegal aliens within it would not justify a
search of the trunk of such a vehicle.
Other cases have similarly held such stops/searches by roving
patrols to be invalid even when the proximity of the border is as
close as three miles.

In United States v. Perez, 644 F2d 1299 (1981),

the Ninth Circuit ruled that customs agents searching a

vehicle

located three miles north of the Mexican border was invalid because
there was no nexus of the vehicle to the crossing of the border.
The Ninth Circuit also held that a search of the vehicle known
to have crossed the border was illegal where the surveillance of
the vehicle after the crossing of the border was not continuous.
See United States v. Portillo, 469 F2d 907 (1972).
Recently the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case of
State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (1985), reversed a conviction of
burglary on the grounds that the stop and search of the defendant
which produced evidence previously stolen from a burglary was illegally
seized.

In Swanigan householders had phoned the police when they

returned home and found out that their home had been burglarized.
An officer went to investigate and while enroute to the home noticed
two individuals walking alongside a road.
"stared" at the officer as he drove by.

Both individuals allegedly
Later on the officer re-

quested that other officers attempt to locate the two individuals
he had seen earlier.

Approximately two hours later another officer

spotted the two individuals (fitting the description given by the
previous officer) about three blocks from the victim's home.

This

officer ordered the two individuals to stop, asked for identification,
made a warrant check and found out that one of the persons had an
outstanding traffic warrant.

Both were arrested and in the subsequent

pat down search of the pair some of the jewelry and property taken
from the victim's home was discovered.
At trial the defendant challenged his detention under Terry
v. Ohio, supra, the trial court denied the motion holding that under
Adams v. Williams, 407 US 143 (1972), that the detention was based
upon a "reasonable suspicion" on the part of the officers.

In

reversing, the Utah Supreme Court held, quoting from Brown v. Texas,
443 US 47, 51 (1979), that:
"A brief investigatory stop of an individual by
police officers is permissible when the officers
have a reasonable suspicion based on objective
facts that the individual is involved in criminal
activity."
The court held that the officer who stopped the defendant and
his companion lacked a reasonable suspicion to believe that they had
engaged in criminal conduct.

The court stated:

"The stop was based solely on a description by a
fellow officer who had observed the two earlier
in an area where many burglaries had been reported,
Neither officer had observed either of the men
engaged in an'unlawful or suspicious activity,
therefore the stop was based on a mere hunch rather
than the constitutionally mandated reasonable
suspicion."
Apropos in the Swanigan case is that no signifigance was given
to the fact that the two individuals stopped had earlier "stared"
at the first officer.
The "automobile search" exception to the warrant requirement
was first set out in the case of Carroll v. United States, 267 US
132 (1925).

This case involved a violation of the Volstead Act,

the officer however having ample probable cause to stop the vehicle,
the defendants previously agreeing to sell liquor to the same federal
agents in another state.
Brinegar v. United States, :supra, parallels the Carroll case
in that when the officers stopped the car the defendant was known

to them by reputation, had been arrested five months previously
for illegal transportation of aliens and had been observed loading
liquor into his car in Missouri, the car also appeared to be heavily
loaded and it increased its speed in an attempt to evade the officers.
In United States v. Ross, 456 US 798 (1982) , the Supreme Court
upheld the search of a bag in a pouch located in the trunk of
defendant's vehicle because the police had received information from
and informant that defendant was selling narcotics out of the trunk
of his car, his physical description and a description of the automobile and also his alias and a description of the neighborhood
where he could be found were given to the police.

The defendant was

also observed in the area by means of his license number which resulted in the confirmation of his alias.
In upholding the search in Ross the Supreme Court again viewed
the exception to the warrant requirement established in Carroll, supra,
and reaffirmed that such exception applies only to searches of vehicles
that are supported by probable cause and that in this class of cases
a search is not unreasonable if based on facts which would justify
the issuance of a warrant even though a warrant had not actually been
obtained.
In United States v. Rubakava-Montoya, 597 F2d 140 (1978),
defendant was convicted of transporting illegal aliens having been
arrested two weeks earlier at the same check point on similar charges.
On this occasion he got out of his car and walked toward the agent
with a "dejected" or "hangdog" look on his face.

The court held

that a prior arrest and an unusual demeanor are insufficient facts
upon which to base probable cause to search.
In United States v. Loper, 564 F2d 710 (5th Cir. 1977), defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

He was stopped in his vehicle at a check point at the

intersection of two roads, both of which were approximately 55 miles
from the Mexican border.
The defendant did not make eye contact with the agents, his
car was riding high in the back and it was registered in a county
located 300 miles away.
The Fifth Circuit held that this evidence was insufficient
to establish probable cause.

The failure to make eye contact with

law enforcement officers is a commonplace occurrance. The truck
riding high is the opposite of what would be expected of a car transporting aliens, and persons whose license plates are from out of the
county or state should be allowed to travel freely without having
their purposes questioned.
Loper, supra, parellels the testimony of the Border Patrol
officers in this case,

i.e. that when approaching defendant's

vehicle neither the driver or the passenger looked back at the
officers which to the officers was a "suspicious" action on their
part, and in addition the vehicle they drove carried California
license plates, a "border state" which further heightened their
suspicions.
In conclusion, all the cases cited above regarding roving patrol
stops by Border Patrol officers indicate that probable cause is
necessary to affect the stop.

Even if this court determines that

a "reasonable suspicion" standard is appropriate then the facts of
this case bear out clearly that the officers had no reasonable
suspicion to stop this vehicle.

The testimony of the officers is

clear in that they wanted to stop the car to "take a second look",
that they "wondered" if there was anyone else in the car other than
the driver and the passenger, and that the officers outrageous conduct
in speeding up to speeds of 80 to 85 miles an hour behind defendant's
vehicle causing them to pull over to the right side of the road and

then characterizing that conduct as "erratic"

driving is no more

than a facile attempt to manufacture their own probable cause or
suspicions and give

credence to a "hunch" that they had that the

occupants of the vehicle might be illegal aliens.

There is no

question that the application of the lowest standard available,
that of "reasonable suspicion" was applied by the trial court in
this case when it clearly said it found "no basis" for the stop of
the vehicle.

It would appear then, that there is no magic in the

words reasonable suspicion when a trial judge finds no basis for the
stop in question.
The Attorney General's reliance on State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d
1302, is misplaced.

In Gibson, the defendant was convicted of

driving with a revoked driver1s license, on the basis of a state
trooper's stopping him in his automobile, the court holding that the
trooper had a"reasonable suspicion" that the defendant's driver's
license was and had been and still was revoked.

In Gibson, the

trooper in question was present when defendant was tried and convicted
for driving under the influence.

On June 1, 1981, the trooper checked

the defendant's driver's license and found that in fact it had been
revoked (presumably for a year under Utah law).
On September 21, 19 81, the trooper observed the defendant
driving his vehicle and knowing that the driver's license of the
defendant had been revoked, stopped the defendant to ascertain if
the license was still revoked.

The stop of the defendant was held

valid by the court in that the officer had unique personal information that the defendant in all probability was driver on a revoked
license.
There is no question of reasonable suspicion in the Gibson
case and neither the facts in Gibson nor the application of the
reasonable suspicion test assists in the determination of the case

at bench.
In a recent case the Supreme Court of Utah filed February 4,
1986, State v. Carpena, 27 Utah ADV. REP. 29, the court upheld in
a per curiam opinion the suppression of evidence by the District
Court of narcotics seized by officers.
In Carpena, supra, a police officer on patrol at 3:00 A.M.,
in a neighborhood which had a high incident of burglaries observed
a slowly moving automobile with Arizona license plat.es.

The officer

did not observe any criminal or traffic offenses and had no information of a report of a burglary on that particular night.

The officer

followed the car for three blocks, then turned on his red lights,
at which time the car pulled into a driveway belonging to one of
the occupants of the car.
After detaining the occupants the officer found an unloaded
pistol in the vehicle, took the keys from the ignition, opened the
trunk without consent and found 30 pounds of marijuana in a garment
bag.
The Supreme Court in upholding the District Court's suppression
order and citing Swanigan, supra, found that the police officer had
no reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop, that the
stop was based merely on the fact that a car with out-of-state plates
was moving slowly through a residential neighborhood late at night,
that the officer had no objective facts upon which to base a reasonable suspicion that the men were involved in criminal activity.
Carpena is significant in that it would appear that the officer
in that case had more objective facts upon which to base the stop
than the Border Patrol officers in the case at bench.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANTS DID HAVE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN THE VEHICLE IN WHICH THEY WERE RIDING AND
LEGALLY POSSESSED, ALLOWING THEM TO CHALLENGE THE

STOP/SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE.
The Attorney General does not argue the different positions
of the driver versus the passenger as to the "standing" issue
and therefore this argument will be addressed only to the question
of whether the driver (Mendoza) had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the vehicle which he had borrowed from his friend Gomez
to complain initially of the stop of the vehicle, the manner in
which in was carried out, the arrest and subsequent search of the
vehicle.
The State relies

on the case of State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d

1334 (Utah 1984).
A close reading of Valdez, supra, indicates that the defendant
in that case was validly stopped when in the early morning hours
police officers noticed that he and a female companion were driving
a car which had no front license place (a violation of law), and
stopped the vehicle to check the driver and his registration.

The

defendant produced a driver's license with his photograph but with
a false name imprinted upon it and he was validly arrested for that
offense.
Upon questioning defendant denied ownership of the car, the
officers searched the vehicle discovering a briefcase in the trunk
which contained forged checking materials.
The Supreme Court in declining to reach the search and seizure
issues involved in the case decided that based on the defendant's
statements denying ownership in the car or the briefcase he had
failed to show any 'legitimate expectation in the effects searched"
and therefore had no standing to complain of that search.
In the case at bench, long before the issue of the search of
the trunk of the vehicle was raised, the defendants challenged the

propriety of the initial stop and it was discussed earlier in this
brief.
There is no question that based on the facts of the stop as
testified to in the District Court that the judge made a correct
ruling on that issue.
With regard to defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy
in the vehicle in which they were riding and the contents of that
vehicle it appears clear from the testimony that Mendoza had
received

valid permission from the registered owner of the vehicle,

Gomez, to not only drive the vehicle to Las Vegas but to allow
defendant Mendieta to ride as a passenger on the way to Colorado,
Mendieta offering to pay $100 for expenses, i.e. gasoline for the
trip north.
Certainly, the two defendants had every right and reason to
believe that the vehicle in which they were riding and their own
personal effects in that .vehicle were lawfully in their possession
and therefore had a reasonable expectation of privacy therein.
Adopting the Attorney General's argument that an ownership
interest in the vehicle is necessary

and essential to advance the

theory of a legitimate expectation of privacy, would apparently leave
all persons who travel by bus, airplane, train, etc., in the position
of having no "standing" to complain of a search of those vessels in
that they did not own them but merely riding in them with the
permission of the carrier.

Such a contention is ludicrous and with-

out any basis in common sense.
The Attorney General argues that the trial court based its
finding of standing solely on defendant's possession of and presence
in the vehicle they were driving, but that does not fairly state
the evidence received by the District Court judge.
Testimony was taken at the hearing of the motion to suppress

from defendant Mendoza that he had borrowed the car from Gomez,
that he had talked to Gomez later from Las Vegas, had obtained
Gomez1 permission to allow Mendieta to ride along in the car, that
Mendieta was going to pay expenses for the trip north with a
further promise that he (Mendoza) would return the car to Los Angeles
by the following Sunday.
That evidence was admitted over objection of the county attorney
who objected on hearsay grounds, however, the classic definition of
hearsay does not apply to words of direction, consent, permission
and identification. See Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 801.
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803 defines certain exceptions
to the hearsay rule, i.e. Rule 803(1) A present sense impression
describing or explaining an event or condition made while declarant
was perceiving the event or immediately thereafter.

Rule 803(3)

the statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion
i.e

intent, motive etc.
See also Wharton Evidence 13th Edition, Volume 2.
POINT III
THE STATEMENTS ELICITED FROM BOTH THE DRIVER AND
PASSENGER BY THE BORDER PATROL OFFICERS AT THE
TIME THE VEHICLE WAS STOPPED WERE OBTAINED IN
VIOLATION OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA INASMUCH AS
DEFENDANTS WERE BEING "DETAINED" AND NOT FREE TO
TO LEAVE THE SCENE AT THE TIME THE STATEMENTS
WERE MADE, SUCH STATEMENTS BEING THE PREDICATE
FOR THE LATER ARREST OF DEFENDANTS AND THE SEARCH
OF THE VEHICLE.
It is clear from the testimony of both Border Parol officers

that both defendants were interrogated, told to produce papers,
questioned as to their legal status after the initial stop and prior
to any search and only upon the answers being given by the defendants
were they arrested for violation of federal law, i.e. illegal aliens
in the United States, and it was conceded by both officers that
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there was no advisement of their right to remain silent prior to
the interrogation.
The Attorney General does not address the issues as to the
statements of the respondents/defendants being in violation of
Miranda v. Arizona, however the District Court judge in his order
of suppression specifically ordered all statements made by both
defendants subsequent to the stop of the vehicle suppressedf therefore,
the statements of the defendants being the primary if not exclusive
reason for their arrest and the search of the vehicle following that
arrest being based the officer's thought "might" be another illegal
alien in the trunk, it seems clear that if the stop was illegal, then
the warrantless search of the trunk is also illegal.
POINT IV AND V
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FAILURE TO SPECIFY THAT THE
OFFICERS ACTED IN BAD FAITH IS NOT FATAL,
ALTERNATIVELY, THE FINDINGS BY THE TRIAL COURT
ON THIS ISSUE ARE NOT REQUIRED AT ALL IF THIS
COURT FIND THAT RULE 12(g) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND IN VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
FOURTH AMENDMENT, IN THAT IT SETS A LOWER STANDARD
THAN THE MINIMUM SET BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT.
The Attorney General argues that the trial court in failing
to make specific findings regarding Rule 12(g)(1) at the suppression
hearing and its later refusal to do so upon the motion to reconsider
amounts to the trial court's ignoring the

specific requirements

of the rule and therefore is fatal to the finding that the trial
court made when it suppressed the evidence.
This view of the trial court's ruling and the evidence elicited
at the motion to suppress ignores the conduct of the Border Patrol
officers in the manner in which they stopped the vehicle and their
alleged reasons for doing so.
To require such technical "niceties" from a trial court judge

when the evidence is abundantly clear that the conduct of the
officers involved was egregious and both the reasons they had for
stopping the vehicle and the manner in which it was stopped is
ludicrous.
The Attorney General argues at some length about the effect
of United States v. Leon, 104 Supreme Court 3405 (1984) , in which
that court fashioned an objective "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule, recognizing that that case specifically involved
a case in Burbank, California, in which a search warrant was relied
upon by the officers making the arrests and seizures.
In discussing Leon, supra, and indicating that the Utah Supreme
Court has never ruled upon the constitutionality of its "good faith"
exception, refusing to do so in the State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099,
the Attorney General seems to be inviting this court to so rule in
this case.
However, the Attorney General is reduced to citing to this court
the case of United States v. Williams, 622 F2d 830 (5th Circuit 1980) ,
a case that predated Leon by four years,

and then by some unknown

extension of logic argues that the "good faith" exception to warrantless searches should be applied ab initio vis a vis Williams, supra,
which to say the least is puzzling.
In the Williams case, supra, the defendant was arrested by a
federal narcotics agent for violating a court imposed travel restriction imposed as a condition of bail while the defendant was awaiting
trial.
The officer had personal knowledge that the condition of travel
had been imposed, and therefore when he stopped her acted in good
faith on the belief that her bail conditions remained in force and
that therefore she was in violation of a statute.

The subsequent incidental search of the defendant produced the
heroin which was the subject of the later prosecution.
This case turned simply on whether or not the officer in making
the arrest for an alleged "contempt of court" in that the defendant
had violated her conditions of release on a federal case was made in
"good faith"

or whether it was made in a bad faith intent to harass

the defendant or for other reasons.
The court discussed certain forms of "technical violations" made
in good faith when the officers relied on a statute that is later
declared unconstitutional or as in the Williams case on a reasonable
interpretation of the statute that is later construed differently
(the Contempt Statute), the court observing, that the exception applies
only if the police belief is both bonafide and reasonable.

Suppression

will still result if the officers allege a good faith belief in a
"law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of
reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws", or in a law that
violated a "controlling precedent that it was. . . unconstitutional."
Quoting from Michigan v. Defillipo, 443 US at 38, 99 Supreme Court at
2632.
In any event, Rule 12(g)(2) states that a search or seizure shall
in all cases be deemed substantial if one or more of the following is
established by the defendant or applicant by a preponderance of the
evidence:
(i)

The violation was grossly negligent, willful,
malicious, shocking to the conscience of the
court or was a result of the practice of the
law enforcement agency pursuant to a general
order of that agency;
(ii) The violation was intended only to harass
without legitimate law enforcement purposes.

Rule 12(g)(3) states as follows:
In determining whether a peace officer was acting
in good faith under this section the court shall
consider in addition to any other relevant factors

some or all of the following;
(i) The extent of deviation from legal search and
seizures standards;
(ii) The extent to which exclusion will tend to
deter future violations of search and seizure
standards;
(iii)Whether or not the officer was proceeding by
way of a search warrant, arrest warrant, or
relying on previous specific directions of a
magistrate or prosecutor; or
(iv) The extent to which privacy was invaded.
(v) If the defendant or applicant establishes that
the search and seizure was unlawful and substantial by a preponderance of the evidence,
the peace officer or governmental agency must
then, by a preponderance of the evidence,
prove the good faith actions of the peace officer.
It would appear from the evidence elicited at the motion to
suppress that the defense proved to the satisfaction of the trial
judge that the violation by the Border Patrol officers was at once
negligent, willful, shocking to the conscience and was a practice
of law enforcement agency (Border Patrol) pursuant to the

general

order of that agency, that the officers did not act in good faith
in that the deviation from legal search and seizures standards was
substantial and it was obvious from the exclusion order that at
least the Border Patrol will be on notice to deter future violations
of the law in these areas, that the officer was not acting pursuant
to a warrant of any kind, and that the extent of privacy that was
invaded was substantial.
On the other hand, the county prosecutor put on no evidence to
show that the Border Patrol officers acted in good faith, just the
contrary was shown by the evidence.
The Attorney General cites another case to this court INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 104 Supreme Court 3479 (1984), as a basis for the
Attorney General's theory that the good faith extension of Leon should
be applicable to warrantless searches.
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra, had to do with

a

deportation

proceeding, a civil action to determine eligibility to remain in the

United States, and the issue was whether or not the issue of an
illegal arrest of the alien could be raised to block the proceeding
which was seeking to deport him.
The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not
apply in a deportation hearing, that hearing being civil in nature,
any reference to "good faith" in that case was purely dicta

and

had nothing to do with the issues nor the holding.
It is .respondent's position that the trial court was not required
to make specific findings on the record to avoid the sanctions of
Rule 12(g),rather those findings are clear by implication in the trial
court1s suppression order and also from the evidence it heard prior to
making that order.
This court's position in the State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099,
1103 Utah (1985),(supra), indicates clearly that this court will not
address the constitutionality of an issue i.e. statute rule, etc., if
the case can be decided on other grounds.
It is respondent's suggestion that this court does not have to
inquire into the validity i.e. constitutionality of Rule 12(g), in
that the case can be decided very simply on the basis of the arguments
made regarding the stop, etc..
If however, the court decides to rule on the validity of Rule 12(g)
then this court must realize that the standards set in Rule 12(g) are
much lower than those set out by the United States Supreme Court.
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution made
applicable on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, no state can
set standards for compliance with Fourth Amendment protections that
are lower than those set by the United States Supreme Court.

See

United States v. Robinson, 414 US 218, and Gustafson v. Florida, 414
US 260 (1973), and also the discussion in People v. Brisendine, 13
Cal3d 528, 545, in which the California Supreme Court discussed the

applicability of Gustafson and Robinson, supra, as being binding on
the California Supreme Court (This was a pre 1982 case prior to
California's Proposition 8 Initiative) and viewed the federal cases
as being the minimum standards required in order to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment proscription of unreasonable searches.
United States Supreme Court in Cooper v. California. (1967)
386 US 58, 52, recognized the well-known principle that a state can
impose higher standards on Fourth Amendment issues than that required
by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so, but not lower
standards.
It seems abundantly clear in the case at bench that the conduct
complained of by the Border Patrol officers was an illegal stop, search,
interrogation under federal law, but to require a lower

standard by

reason of the mandates of Rule 12(g) by a finding of "bad faith" on
the part of the arresting officers clearly imposes a lower standard
than that required by the United States Supreme Court

and its

decisions.
This writer is aware of no case which has extended the "good
faith" principle of Leon, supra, applicable to warrant searches being
extended to warrantless searches.
The Attorney General invites this court to do so in its construing of Rule 12(g), however, respondent as stated above urges both that
the court not engage in that analysis because it does not have to and
secondly, if the court feels it must, that it must gauge that analysis
by Fourth Amendment standards as set by the United States Constitution
and the applicable Supreme Court decisions in that area.
POINT VI
THE BORDER PATROL AGENTS HAD NO LEGAL AUTHORITY
TO STOP THE MUSTANG WITH OR WITHOUT A REASONABLE
SUSPICION OR PROBABLE CAUSE; THEY WERE NEITHER
PEACE OFFICERS OF THE STATE OF UTAH AS DEFINED

IN THAT STATE'S CODE NOR WERE THEY AUTHORIZED
BY FEDERAL LAW TO STOP VEHICLES MORE THAN 100
MILES FROM ANY CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES BORDER.
The Utah Laws of Criminal Procedure, Section 77-2-1, specifies
what constitute a Category III peace officer and in Sub-Section (d),
specifies federal officers recognized as peace officers in the State
of Utah.
Although Utah recognizes special agents of the United States
Customs among others there is no recognition of officers of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of which the Border
Patrol officers are employees.
Therefore, quite simply, the Border Patrol officers were not in
the State of Utah pursuant to any request by any sheriff or others
in authority in the State of Utah, not having any authority to make
arrests under Utah law for any violation of law and not being
authorized to perform border patrol functions more than 100 miles
from the border pursuant to rules set out by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (See 8 CFR Chapter One, Section 287)
(Appendix 1 attached)•
It it clear from the Code of Federal Regulations and also
Title 8, Section 1357 of the Immigration Act (See Appendix 2) that
the Border Patrol officers were many hundreds of miles from either
the Canadian or Mexican border when they elected to stop respondents
on Interstate 15 on the night in question.
Clearly there was no showing by the prosecution that anyone in
Utah with authority requested them to be there, that there is no eviderice that the district director (of the INS) that, in his opinion,
there was a necessity for having Border Patrol agents more than 100
miles from the external boundary of the border and that therefore,
in the absence of such direction by the director of INS

(which would

be questionable to say the least) the Border Patrol officers were
acting without the authority of any Utah mandate and without the
authority of the United States Government when they stopped the
defendants/respondents.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons this court should affirm the trial
court's order suppressing the evidence.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of March, 1986.
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Board w -in 15 days after the mailing
of the notification of decision as provided in Part 3 of this chapter
(Sees. 103. 239. 254. 255. 256. 271. 273 and
280. 8 U S C 1103. 1229. 1284. 1285. 1286.
1321.1323 and 1330)
[22 F R 9808. Dec 6. 1957, as amended at 23
P R 9124. Nov 26, 1958. 46 PR 28624. May
28. 19813

PART 282—FORMS FOR SALE TO
PUBLIC
8 282.1
er.

Forms printed by the Public Print-

The Public Printer is authorized to
print for sale to the public, the forms
listed in $ 299.3 of this chapter.
(Sec. 103. 66 Stat. 173. 8 U S.C 1103)
[45 PR 6777. Jan. 30. 1980]

PART 297—FIELD OFFICERS; POWERS
AND DUTIES
Sec
287.1 Definitions
287 2 Criminal violations, investigation and
action
287 3 Disposition of cases of aliens arrested
without warrant.
287 < Subpoena*
287 5 Power and authority to administer
oaths
287 6 Proof of official records.
AUTHORITY Sees 103, 235. 236 242, 287 66

Stat. 173. 198. 200. 208. as amended, 23a, 8
U S C . 1103. 1225, 1226, 1252. 1357
§ 287.1

Definition*.

(a)(1) External boundary The term
"external boundary," as used in section 287(a)(3) of the Act, means the
land boundaries and the coast line of
the United States, including the ports,
harbors, bays and other enclosed arms
of the sea along the coast, and a marginal belt of the sea extending three
geographic miles from the outer limits,
of the land that encloses an arm of
the sea.
(?tet^iraiap<iminrflilgwin » The term
"reasonable distance," as used in section 287(a) (3) of the Act, means
within 100 aif suits from any external
boundary of the United States or any
shorter distance which may be fixed
by the district director, or, so far as

"APPENDIX 1 "

is concernea «*ny distance fixed purtu*
*nt to paragraph (b) of this section.
(b) Reasonable dutance; fixing fey
district directors. In fixing" distance*
riot exceeding 100 air miles pursuant
vo pw^grapY* \*> oi tons section, district directors shall take into consideration topography, confluence of art*
fies of transportation leading from ex*
ternal boundaries, density of population, possible inconvenience to tht
traveling public, types of conveyances
vised, and reliable information as to
rnovements of persons effecting illegal
^ntry into the United States: PmpUb&
jd, That whenever in the opinion of %
district director a distance in his district of more, Lhatt,JL0O~air miles^ from
^ny external boundary of the United
States W4>uid-because of unusual etr^uxnstances be reasonable, such district director shall forward a complete
feport with respect to the matter to
the Conuniaaumef , who p*ay, if he determines that such action is justified,
declare such distance to be reasonable
(c) Exercise of power by immigration
Officers. Any immigration officer is
hereby authorized to exercise anywhere in the United States all the
powers conferred by section 287 of the
Act.
(d) Disposition of felony cases. The
cases of persons arrested for felonies
under paragraph (4) of section 287(a)
ol the Immigration and Nationality
Act shall be handled administratively
in accordance with the applicable provisions of § 287.2 but in no case shall
there be prejudiced the right of the
person arrested to be taken without
unnecessary delay before another
near-by officer empowered to commit
persons charged with offenses against
the laws of the United States.
(e) Power i a arr**t persons who
pnTia^Jmnspoti.
or hotter emtoin
aliens, o- %nducm them to enter. Any
immigration officer shall have authority to make arrests for violations of
an, provision of section 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
m ?Ot7oUi»*theb<mier* The phrase
"patrolling the border to prevent tne
illegal entry of aliens into the United
states" as used in section 287 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act
insane conducting such activities a*
*s^ <^vu^tt\&£^, <w w*&fei\a&& and nee-

1

£ ( * • itlon and

Notur«

ition Service, Justice

§ 287.4

without warrant of arrest snail be advised of the reason of his arrest and
his right to be represented by counsel
Dtc e l W 7
* » » ** w n e n d e d a l 29
of his own choice, at no expense to the
!fofc'lH 9W*»
Si»44.8cpt.24.1964)
Government. He shall also be provided
I07J Criminal violations; investigation with a list o( the available free legal
services programs qualified under Part
, r tod action.
292a of this chapter and organizations
l^benever a district director or chief recognized
pursuant to § 292.2 of this
itrol agent has reason to believe that chapter, located
in the district where
Sere has been a violation punishable his deportation hearing
will be held. It
fflfer any criminal provision of the shall be noted on Form
that
fevs administered or enforced by the such a list was provided to1-213
the
alien.
gBrvice, he shall cause an investigation He shall also be advised that any
(0 be made immediately of all the perhe makes may be used
tfrmpt facts and circumstances and statement
him in a subsequent proceedgall take or cause to be taken such against
and thai a decision wUKbe~mad#*
further action as the results of such ing
within 24 hours or less as to whether
investigation warrant.
he will be continued in custody or released on bond or recognizance. Unless
JJ5FB16362. Oct. 20,1970]
voluntary departure has been granted
igtfj Disposition of cases of aliens ar- pursuant to § 242.5 of this chapter, the~-»
$J rested without warrant.
alien's-cas^ shall be presented prompt***
? 4p.likiya«**t*rt> without-a warrant ly„ and in any event within 2^ hours,6f arrest under the authority con- to the district director, acting-district
tained in section 287(a)(2) of the Im- director, deputy district director, as*
migration and Nationality Act shall be sistant district director for investigaj:>oamined as therein provided by an tions, officers in charge at Agana, GU;
'Officer other than the arresting offi- Albany, NY; Charlotte Amalie. VI;
\ etr, unless no other qualified officer is Cincinnati, OH; Hammond, IN; Mil; readily available and the taking of the waukee, WI; Norfolk. VA; Oklahoma
* alien before another officer would City, OK; Pittsburgh, PA; Providence,
** entail unnecessary delay, in which RI; Salt Lake City. UT; St. Louis, MO;
*' event the arresting officer, if the con- Spokane, WA for a determination as
& duct of such examination is a part of to whether there is prima facie eviJ the duties assigned to him, may exam- dence that the arrested alien is in the
n toa the alien. If such examining offi- United States in violation of law and
|,cw U satisfied that there is prima for issuance of an order to show cause
S facie evidence establishing that the ar« and warrant of arrest prescribed in
wrested alien was entering or attempt- Part 242 of this chapter
?£to« to enter the United States in violat i o n of the immigration laws, he shall C22 FR 9808, Dec 6. 19S?r as amended at 32
Jan. 23,
a t *eter the case to an immigration judge FH 6260, Apr. 21. 1967; 44 FR 4654,
1
Jg. tor further inquiry in accordance with 1979; 44 FR, 15996, Mar. 16. 1979 J
a* Parts 235 and 236 of this chapter or
Jg take whatever other action may be ap- § 287,4 Subpoena.
(a) Who may issue—(1) Prior to com-,
m Propriate or required' under the laws
|> <* other regulations applicable to the rnencement of proceedings. Except as
¥ Darticular case. If the examining offi- provided in 5 335.11 of this chapter,
| . cer is satisfied that there is prima subpoena requiring the attendance of
- «cie evidence establishing that the ar- witnesses or the production of docu^4 jested alien is in the United States in mentary evidence, or both, may be
?f violation of the immigration laws, fur- issued by a district director upon his
l> ther action in the case shall be taken own volition prior to the commence• •• Provided
in Part 242 of this chapter. ment of a proceeding.
if *r t n e e x a m i m n & officer has deter<2) Subsequent to commencement of
ge mined that formal proceedings under proceedings. In any proceeding under
this chapter, other than under Part
F;S?iUons 236 ' 237* o r 2 4 2 o f t n e A c t »
IkJ**** be instituted, an alien arrested 335 of this chapter, and in any prof^ary, to prevent the illegal entry of
fS i into the United States.
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§ 1356

IMMIGRATION
Croas

Ch. 12

Reference*

Definition of the term-—
Alien, see section 1101 fa) (3) of this title.
Service, set* aectiun 1101(a) (34) of this title.

§

1357*

of immigration officers and employees—
Powers without warrant

POWCTS

(a) Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney Genera! shall have power without
warrantCD to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien
as to his right to be or to remain in the United States;
(2) to arrest any alien who in his presence or view is entering
or attcmptinsr to enter the United States in violation of any law
or regulation made in pursuance of law regulating the admission, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, or to arrest any alien in
the United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so
arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or
regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest, but the alien arrested shall be taken without unnecessary delay for examination before an officer of the
Service having authority to examine aliens as to their right to
enter or remain in the United States;
(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary
of the United States, to board and search for aliens any vessel
within the territorial waters of the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle, and within a distance
of twenty-five miles from any such external boundaiy to have
access to private lands, but not dwellings, for the purpose of
patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into
the United States; and t '
(4) to make arrests for felonies which have been committed
and which are cognizable under,any law of the United States
regulating the admission, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, if
he has reason to believe that the person so arrested is guilty of
such felony and if there is likelihood of the person escaping before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest, but the person
arrested shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the
nearest available officer empowered to commit persons charged
with offenses against the laws of the United States. Any such
employee shall also have the power to execute any warrant or
other process issued by any officer under any law regulating
the admission, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens.
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POWERS OF OFFICERS

8 § 1357

A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of o a t h t t a k i n g of e v i d e n c e

(b) Any officer or employee of the Service designated by the Attorney General, whether individually or as one of a class, shall have
power and authority to administer oaths and to take and consider
evidence concerning the privilege.of any person to enter, reenter,
pass through, or reside in the United States, or concerning any matter which is material or relevant to the enforcement of this chapter
and the administration of the Service; and any person to whom such
oath has been administered, under the provisions of this chapter,
who shall knowingly or willfully give false evidence or swear to any
false statement concerning any matter referred to in this subsection
shall be guilty of perjury and shall be punished as provided by section 1621 of Title 18.
Search w i t h o u t w a r r a n t

(c) Any officer of employee of the Service authorized and designated under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, whether
individually or as one of a class, shall have power to conduct a
search, without warrant, of the person, and of the personal effects in
the possession of any person seeking admission to the United States,
concerning whom such officer or employee may have reasonable
cause to suspect that grounds exist for exclusion from the United
States under this chapter which would be disclosed by such search.
June 27, 1002, c. 477, Title II, ch. 9, § 287, 66 Stat. 233.
Historical Note
Leg Istntltct HUtory.
For U'k'MuUvi!
history and purpose of Act June 27 1052,
Cross

nea VJW1 U 8,('«>dfl Cong
p 1653

and Ad in Newt,

itoforonoos

Definition of the term—
Allen, see section 1101(a) (3) of this title.
Attorney General, soe section 1101(a) (5) of this title.
Entry, see section 1101(a) (13) of this title.
Immigration officer, see section 1101 (a) (18) of this title.
Service, see section 1101(a) (34) of this title;
United States, see section 1101(a) (38) of this title
Felony classified as sn offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a terra
exceeding one yeur, see section 1 of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure.
Library
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Aliens <§=>44
Searches and Seizures £=»3.3, 7(11).

C J S Aliens 55 80. S3
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Notes
Generally 4
Arrest without warrant
Generally 12
Escape, likelihood of
Probable cause 14
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Decisions
Authority of officers 4
Constitutionality 1
Construction 2
Custodial Interrogation 10
l>u« process 8

423

